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ARTICLES
SEMTEK, FORUM SHOPPING, AND FEDERAL
COMMON LAW
Stephen B. Burbank*
INTRODUCrION

This is an Article about what Justice Jackson would have called
lawyers' law.' It treats of some difficult problems in a corner of conflict of laws that proceduralists have occupied-where state and federal law vie for space-problems that I set out to solve early in my
career.2 It treats as well of a decision last Term in which the Supreme
Court accepted the most controversial of the solutions I proposed fif© Stephen B. Burbank, 2002.
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard University. David Shapiro, Catherine
Struve, and Stephen Subrin provided helpful comments on a draft. This Article is a
revised version of Reason, Rigor and Regret: An Essay for Arthur von Mehren, in LAw AND
JUSTICE IN A MULTSTATE WoRLD: A TIBUTE TO ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN (James A.R.

Nafziger & Simeon C. Symeonides eds., forthcoming 2002) (internal citation
unavailable). I owe an enormous intellectual debt to Professor von Mehren. As I said
in the original:
In today's academic environment, which may prize the volume of sound
more than its quality, Arthur is proof that it need not be thus, that there is a
place for scholars who heed Theodore Roosevelt's advice to "walk softly and
carry a big stick." In his case the "big stick" is a mind so rigorous, an intellectual appetite so wide-ranging, and a tolerance for ambiguity so serene, as to
be, depending on the audience, either intimidating, discouraging or impenetrable. Those qualities can also be, as they have been for me, inspiring,
causing one to dig deeper into a problem and to view that problem in
broader perspective, to be relentless in pursuing the implications of an idea,
and, above all, never to accept without verifying the conventional wisdom.
Id. (internal citation unavailable) (footnotes omitted).
1 See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 1, 2 (1945).
2 See Stephen B. Burbank, Inter'urisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A GeneralApproach, 71 CoRNEIL L. Ruv. 733 (1986).
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teen years ago.3 More broadly, my hope is to cast some light both on
the question whether forum shopping between state and federal court
is a problem worthy of concern today and on the nature, including
the politics, of procedural scholarship.
I.

DISCOVERY AND DISILLUSIONMENT

Fresh from a reexamination of the Supreme Court's power under
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 4 1undertook what I thought would be
a small project exploring the relationship between federal and state
law on issues in the "twilight zone ' 5 between procedure and substantive law that are not controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The question I initially sought to answer was whether federal or
state law governs the preclusive (resjudicata) effects of the judgments
of federal courts sitting in diversity. Professor Ronan Degnan's seminal article, FederalizedResJudicata,6 in which he argued that the court
system which renders a judgment should provide the rules as to the
judgment's preclusive effects, had much impressed me. But it seemed
to me that both Degnan and those who embraced his proposal, even
while modifying it,7 had failed fairly to confront the implications for
this context of Supreme Court decisions in diversity cases that articulated a federal policy against different outcomes on the basis of
8
citizenship.
3 See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
4 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994)); see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). This work engendered in me no small amount of disillusionment as to what counts for scholarship in the field of procedure and the relationship between scholarship and law reform. See id. at 1186. It did not help that, shortly
after the article (my first) was published, a prominent academic commenced our first
conversation with the observation, "I did not like your article." When I inquired why
that was so, he replied, "John Ely is my friend."
5 "The truth is that the twilight zone around the dividing line between substance
and procedure is a very broad one." Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon.
George Wharton Pepper (Dec. 19, 1937), quoted in Burbank, supra note 4, at 1134
n.530.
6 Ronan E. Degnan, FederalizedResJudicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
7 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 87 cmt. b (1982); 18 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4472, at 725 (1981 & Supp.
2001) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]; CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 100A, at 737-38 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS]. These works "take the position that federal law governs but that, as to certain questions of preclusion implicating state substantive policies, state law should be
borrowed as federal law." Burbank, supra note 2, at 780 (footnote omitted).
8 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744-47 (1980); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965) (dictum); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
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Not believing that it was necessary for this project to engage in
extensive historical research, I was prepared to accept Degnan's account of the doctrinal history. Still, I felt obligated at least to read all
of the early cases on which Degnan's account was based. Unfortunately, as I put his article to the test of its footnotes, I realized that,
although FederalizedResJudicatadid make an important contribution,
its capacity to obscur6 was as great as its capacity to illuminate. Numerous errors in describing cases aside, 9 Degnan's history, upon
which some of his followers also relied, was tendentious, if not distorted.' 0 And so, although I had intended a short article on the law
governing the preclusive effects of federal diversity judgments, I was
driven also to investigate the source of the obligation to respect federaljudgments in the first place" and to scratch the oft-repeated, but
hardly analyzed, notion that federal preclusion, law governs the
preclusive effects of the federal question judgments of federal
courts.

12

107-12 (1945). "What is surprising is that those who do not accept Professor
Degnan's complete dispatch of the Rules of Decision Act and who have espoused a
modified version of his general rule for diversity judgments proceed as if these cases
did not exist." Burbank, supra note 2, at 785 (footnote omitted). For a more recent
example, see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-31 (1996).
9 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 741, 742 n.32, 750 n.67.
10 See id. at 741, 745, 749, 749-50 n.65. Professor Cooper apparently picked up
the most serious distortion, a selective quotation from Dupasseurv. Rochereau, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 130 (1875) (the correct date of the decision is found in 22 L. Ed. 588),
since he correctly described the full basis given by the Court for its decision in that
case. See 18 WRicHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7, § 4468, at 655. But he did not
flag the problem in Degnan's work and its role in the story that author told, and the
capacity of that story to mislead continued. See, e.g., Note, Erie and the PreclusiveEffect
of FederalDiversity Judgments, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1505, 1518 (1985); infra note 41.
Thus, within one article I committed the sins of revealing serious flaws in the
work of a senior academic and disparaging the views of the latter's best friend, who
happened to be the lead author of the most influential treatise in federal practice and

procedure. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 791, 796 (criticizing
ERAL COURTS, supra note 7, § 100A); infra note 115.

WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-

11 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 740-47.
12 See id. at 747-78. My research revealed that, contrary to the story told by
Degnan, the Supreme Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries appeared to regard the role of preclusion law as protecting rights conferred by the substantive law and to derive the source of the governing preclusion law from the source
of the governing substantive law, state preclusion law for diversity judgments, and
federal preclusion law for federal question judgments. See id. at 747-53. For the role
that a distinctively federal law of preclusion for federal question judgments played in
the Supreme Court's strategy of controlling state courts in this period, see EDWARD A.
PURCELL,

JR.,

BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRFSSIVE

CONsrrrurION:

ERIE, THE JUDICIAL
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Informed by, but not a captive of, this history, I came to realize
that, with respect to federal judgments and under modem conceptions, the governing law is almost always federal common law. Yet, I
confronted the fact that, since the dual revolution initiated by Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,13 both the Supreme Court and commentators had failed to assimilate problems of federal common law in state
law diversity cases to those in federal law non-diversity cases. I therefore advanced a general approach effecting such assimilation, alternatively grounded in the Supreme Court's approach in (non-diversity)
federal common-law cases or in the Rules of Decision Act, I4 which I
15
regarded (and regard) as the more appropriate unifying vehicle.
My approach failed to support Professor Degnan's general rule,
16
or the modifications suggested by his followers, in diversity cases.
43
(2000).
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938). On the dual revolution, see HenryJ. Friendly, In Praiseof
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964), and Edward
A. Purcell,Jr., Brandeis,Erie, and the New Deal "ConstitutionalRevolution", 26J. Sup. CT.
Hisr. 257, 272-75 (2001).
14 "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
15 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 753-62, 778-97. Having adopted a federal common-law approach to the preclusive effects of federal judgments, I considered the
implications of that approach for state court judgments, with respect to which Professor Degnan made an important contribution by recalling attention to the full faith
and credit statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994); Burbank, supra note 2, at 735;
Degnan, supra note 6, at 750-55. Here, too, the general approach seemed to shed
light, both by exposing the fallacy of treating problems of federal "procedural" law in
state courts as sui generis, and, more importantly, by helping to expose a fundamental
error in the interpretation of the full faith and credit statute implicit in Degnan's
article and subsequently made explicit in decisions of the Supreme Court. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 797-829.
Contrary to conventional formulations, the full faith and credit statute does
not require application of the domestic preclusion law of the rendering
state. Rather, it requires application of the preclusion law that the courts of
the rendering state would apply. That domestic state law usually will furnish
the rules applied domestically should not blind us to the possibility that,
according to principles governing the relationship between federal and state
law that have their source elsewhere, federal law may supervene.
Id. at 800 (footnote omitted).
16 Application of my general approach suggested that the Court and commentators were correct in asserting that federal preclusion law, consisting of uniform judgemade rules, governs the effects of the federal question judgments of federal courts,
although that conclusion was by no means as simple and straightforward as they apparently assumed. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 762-78.
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
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On the contrary, I concluded, with the exception of a few matters as
to which uniform federal law may be required either to safeguard the
basic federal common-law obligation to respect federal judgments or
to vindicate (non-preclusion-related) policies of the federal court qua
forum, the content of that obligation should be measured by state
law. 17 Thus, notwithstanding the major changes in the legal landscape on which Degnan relied, the results I advocated were pretty
much the same as those dictated by the Court's 1875 decision in
Dupasseurv. Rochereau,'8 which he had sought to consign to the fate of
the Conformity Act of 1872.19
Critical to my conclusion about diversity judgments were the dual
propositions that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not, by and
large, contain preclusion law and that they cannot validly prescribe
such law.20 With the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure out of the way
17 See id. at 778-97. Under the Supreme Court's approach to federal common
law, one would say that federal common law borrows state law on most questions
regarding the preclusive effects of diversityjudgments. I would say that state law governs as to such matters because Congress has commanded its borrowing in the Rules
of Decision Act. The last is a detail (albeit, particularly to a judge concerned about
the locus of power, an important detail!), since in either case federal law is the source
of authority. The important point is that state law is the source of most of the rules.
See id. at 753-62, 787-92; Stephen B. Burbank, FederalJudgmentsLaw: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1551, 1556-70 (1992).
18 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875).
19 Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197; see Burbank, supranote 2, at
749; Degnan, supranote 6, at 745-46, 756.
20 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 772-76, 782-83; Burbank, supra note 4, at
1121-31. Fudging on these questions was useful, if only rhetorically, to Professor
Degnan's argument. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 747; Degnan, supra note 6, at
760-63. Indeed, it appears to be an occupational disease. See Howard M. Erichson,
InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, 96 MICH. L. REv. 945, 1006 & n.307 (1998); Graham C.
Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIo ST. LJ. 289, 319-21, 321 n.115 (1993). In
that, scholars have followed in the path of the rulemakers themselves, whose understandable desire to take advantage of the opportunities that preclusion law presents
for achieving efficiency in adjudication has waged a sixty-year struggle with their
awareness that the Enabling Act sets limits on that quest. Thus, although the members of the original Advisory Committee "rejected as exceeding its authority the
strongly urged suggestion that its class action rule should include a provision as to the
preclusive effects of ajudgment on persons not parties," Burbank, supra note 2, at 772
(footnote omitted), they did include a preclusion provision in Rule 14, only to delete
it in 1946 because it "stated a rule of substantive law which is not within the scope of a
procedural rule." Id. at 772 n.184. The struggle continues. The Advisory Committee
is considering proposals to amend Rule 23 so as to include provisions that would give
preclusive effect to rulings denying class certification and refusing to approve a proposed class settlement. In my view, however desirable as a matter of policy, those
proposals are invalid under the Enabling Act. The same results could be obtained by
legislation or, perhaps, by federal common law. See Stephen B. Burbank, Preliminary
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as a source of binding federal preclusion rules (although not as a
source of non-preclusion-related policy that may inform federal common-law rules of preclusion that are otherwise valid 21 ), it seemed to
me impossible tojustify the displacement of state law on most matters
of preclusion. Or, at least so it seemed once one recognized that the
substantive law interests directly at stake were state interests and that
any federal interest in efficient adjudication was contingent, and so
long as one did not dismiss or ignore the articulated federal policy
against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship.
It took a dialogue with Geoffrey Hazard while my project was in
progress to help me understand some of the larger forces that were
operating in favor of that which I found insupportable. I realized that
the reason why some eminent scholars had been able to overcome this
last barrier to accepting Professor Degnan's general rule in diversity
cases, with minor modifications, lay in their unarticulated rejection of
the policy of federal jurisdiction pursued by the Court in cases follow22
ing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
It has taken years of reading history, particularly the work of
Professors Edward Purcell 23 and William Ross, 24 for me to progress
beyond the position of agnosticism I took about that policy in 198625
and to embrace it. Many of those who taught procedure (and federal
courts) when I was in law school at Harvard (1969-1973) were under
Remarks at a Conference on Class Actions Sponsored by the Advisory Committee
(Oct. 23, 2001) (on file with author).
21 See Stephen B. Burbank, Where's the Bee]? The InterjurisdictionalEffects of New
Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RuTcERs L.J. 87, 108-10 (1996).
22 See Stephen B. Burbank, InteriurisdictionalPreclusion and Federal Common Law:
Toward a GeneralApproach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 635-37 (1985); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on the Substance of Finality,70 CORNELL L. REV.'642, 645-52 (1985);
Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to ProfessorHazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 660 (1985).
[Hazard] rejects a line of Supreme Court cases that has only recently been
affirmed and relies on others the vitality of which is in dispute, thus confirming a suggestion made in my paper. I applaud this explicitness; indeed, it is
just what my paper calls for. Of course, now that all the cards are on the
table, lower federal courts may feel reluctant to apply uniform federal preclusion rules in this context. They lack the freedom of law professors to
overrule the Court.
Id. at 660 (footnotes omitted).
23 See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 12; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIvERsrlYJURISDIcrION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992);
Purcell, supra note 13; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsideringthe FrankfurterianParadigm:
Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 679 (1999).
24 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY (1994).
25 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 831.
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the thrall of Henry Hart. As a result, I had no real sense of the serious.
practical and social problems of unfairness, unequal access, and manipulation that underlay Justice Brandeis's opinion in Erie, and hence,
26
little reason to apprehend that similar problems might recur.
In the years after World War I, Brandeis had grown increasingly
concerned over the proliferation of elaborate, exploitative, and
sometimes unethical litigation practices. Since the late nineteenth
century, corporations operating in interstate commerce had regularly-and, in Brandeis' mind, quite unfairly-exploited diversity
removal jurisdiction to impose heavy legal and extra-legal burdens
on individuals who sued them. In response to that practice, an
emerging urban personal injury bar had gradually developed a variety of counter-tactics to defeat corporate removal practices....
Disturbed by the mushrooming tactical escalation and the compounding waste of social resources, Brandeis began exploring ways
to impose greater order and efficiency on litigation practice. He
experimented with the Commerce Clause, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, and even the politically dangerous Due Process Clause as
devices to minimize incentives for interstate forum shopping. Erie
was a part of his overall campaign. Abolishing the general federal
common law would eliminate a major incentive for intra-state forum
shopping and reduce the utility of a variety of popular manipulative
tactics. That achievement, in turn, would mean that courts and litigants could concentrate their efforts on addressing the substantive
merits of disputes. The result would be to simplify litigation pracorder the overall busitice, conserve social resources, and rationally
27
ness of the nation's judicial system.
II.

A.

SEMTEK

The Background

Life is stranger than art. It would be difficult for even the most
adept spinner of law school hypotheticals to devise a case more chal26

See

PURCELL,

supra note 12, at 141-46 ("'Defects, Social': The Progressive as

Legal Craftsman"); id. at 229-57 ("Henry M. HartJr., and the Power of Transforming
Vision").
Perhaps, too, the most general conclusion to be dravn from Hart's vision of
Erie and the federal judicial system is that legal abstraction, while never socially neutral, always remains socially volatile. Without constant reference to
changing social dynamics and consequences, students of procedure can
scarcely know what they are talking about.
Id. at 257; see also Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE
L.J. 829, 847-54 (2001); infra text accompanying note 110.
27 Purcell, supra note 13, at 272-73 (footnotes omitted).
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lenging than Semtek InternationalInc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 28 For the
case presents not only the intricacies of interjurisdictional preclusion
with which I wrestled in 1986, but also the special conflict of laws
problems that attend statutes of limitations. 29 Semtek also well illustrates the relevance today of the practical and social concerns that
undergirded Justice Brandeis's opinion in Erie more than sixty years
ago.
Semtek involves a dispute concerning contract and related rights
30
in the enticing but hazardous economy of post-Soviet Russia.
Semtek was a fledgling company "formed in 1992 to contract with
emerging Russian enterprises, particularly with respect to satellite ventures." 3 1 Convinced that it had been muscled unfairly out of its major
asset, a potentially lucrative joint venture for the commercial use of
Russian satellites, by Martin Marietta Technologies, Inc., Semtek sued
Lockheed (Martin Marietta's successor in interest) and a representative of Martin Marietta in a California state court, alleging breach of
contract and various business torts. Lockheed removed the case to
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship 32 and sought dismissal on the ground that the action was barred by California's twoyear statute of limitations. The district court agreed with Lockheed
33
and dismissed the case.
28 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
29 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, I contacted counsel for Semtek
and obtained the briefs filed to that point. Finding my work relied on extensively in
Semtek's brief on the merits, I provided assistance as a volunteer in fashioning a reply
brief and in preparing the case for oral argument.
30 See Scott D. Syfert, Capitalismor Corruption?CorporateStructure, Western Investment
and Commercial Crime in the Russian Federation, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 357
(1999). For an account of the business dealings that produced the litigation in
Semtek, see id. at 400-02.
31 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497 (2001) (No. 99-1551) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
32 Semtek's action included a non-diverse individual defendant, but Lockheed
removed before formal service and successfully resisted remand on the basis that, at
the time of removal, "none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants [was] a citizen of the state in which [the] action [was] brought." 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994). I admit to surprise that such a ploy, which is reminiscent of
the behavior that concerned Justice Brandeis and led to Erie, see supra text accompanying note 27, was successful. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 883-84
(5th Cir. 1998); 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7, § 3723 (1998 & Supp.
2001).
33 See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Case No.: CV 97-1580 ABC
(RNBx), reprinted in Petition for Certiorari app. D, at 48, Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (No. 99-1551). The court's order provided
that the dismissal was "WITH PREJUDICEbecause, given the allegations in the Complaint, amendment would be futile (Plaintiff cannot plead around or contradict its
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While taking an unsuccessful appeal from the district court's
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,3 4 Semtek sought recovery from Lockheed in a Maryland state

court, relying on Maryland's three-year statute of limitations, under
which the action was timely. Lockheed, which is incorporated in Maryland, unsuccessfully sought to remove that case too,3 5 and it also

failed in an attempt to secure an order from the federal trial court in
California enjoining Semtek from continuing the Maryland litiga6

tion.3

Although unsuccessful in its attempts to remove or enjoin the Maryland state court action, Lockheed succeeded in having that case dismissed as precluded by the judgment of the federal district court in
California. Lockheed argued, and the Maryland trial court agreed,
that the preclusive effect of the federal court diversity judgment was
governed by federal law and that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) ,7 the dismissal precluded an action on the same claim in
current allegations)." Id., reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 58a, Semtek Int'l Inc.
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (No. 99-1551). The court's judgment,
prepared by Lockheed, provided that "the action be dismissed in its entirety on the
merits and with prejudice." Id., reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 59a, Semtek Int'l
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (No. 99-1551).
[I]f the intention of the court, gathered from its order or other source, were
the test of the effect of the judgment on subsequent actions, the doctrine of
resjudicata would disappear as a legal principle, and the bar of ajudgment
would depend wholly upon the whim of the first judge, or, more probably,
on the form of the proposed order drafted by successful counsel.
Goddard v. Sec. Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 92 P.2d 804, 807 (Cal. 1939).
34 Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 168 F.3d 501, 501 (9th Cir. 1999)
(table).
35 See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 988 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md.
1997).
36 See Brief for Petitioner, supranote 31, at 7. In dicta, the district court observed
that its decision dismissing Semtek's action "did not reach the substantive merits of
Plaintiff's tort claims" and that "it is not obvious to this Court that resjudicata applies
to bar Plaintiffs action in Maryland state court." Semtek, 988 F. Supp. at 915 (quoting
Brief for Petitioner, supranote 31, at app. 71a & n.17). Thereafter, Semtek unsuccessfully sought remand from the Ninth Circuit for the purpose of amending the judgment under Rules 60(a) and 60(b) (6), and the district court declined to hear its Rule
60(b) (6) motion. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 7
n.4.
37 (b) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant
may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant.
Unless the court in its orderfor dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissalnot providedfor in this rule, other than a dismissalfor
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Maryland state court. 38 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal, 3 9 and the Maryland Court of Appeals denied
40
review.
B.

The Supreme Court's Decision

In a short opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia declined
to decide the case on one of the grounds urged by Semtek, namely,
the continuing authority of the Court's 1875 decision in Dupasseurv.
Rochereau,4 1 and he rejected Lockheed's argument, which had been
lack ofjurisdiction,for impropervenue, orforfailure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudicationupon the merits.
FED. R. Cry. P. 41(b) (emphasis added).
38 See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Case No. 97183023 (Cir. Ct.
Bait. City 1998), reprinted in Petition for Certiorari app. C, at 36a, Semtek Int'l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (No. 99-1551).
39 Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 736 A.2d 1104, 1121 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1999).
40 That court's unreported order is reprinted in Petition for Certiorari app. B, at
35a, Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (No. 99-1551)
[hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]. The Supreme Court granted Semtek's petition
for certiorari. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 736 A.2d 1104, cert.
granted, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000) (No. 99-1551). Semtek's petition presented two questions, first, whether the Court's holding in Dupasseurv. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
130 (1875), was "still good law," and if not, second, "what should.be the resjudicata
effect of a statute of limitations dismissal in a federal court diversity suit?" Petition for
Certiorari, supra, Questions Presented.
41 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875); see Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001).
[T]he case is not dispositive because it was decided under the Conformity
Act of 1872 ... which required federal courts to apply the procedural law of
the forum state in nonequity cases. That arguably affected the outcome of
the case. See Dupasseur,supra, at 135. See also Restatement (Second) ofJudgments § 87, Comment a, p. 315 (1980) ... ("Since procedural law largely
determines the matters that may be adjudicated in an action, state law had to
be considered in ascertaining the effect of a federal judgment.").
Id.
Semtek had alerted the Court to the problem with Professor Degnan's treatment
of Dupasseurand with the story he told using that case as support. See Reply Brief for
the Petitioner at 11 n.8, Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497
(2001) (No. 99-1551) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner]; supra note 10 and accompanying text; supra note 12; supra text accompanying notes 18-19. That may
explain the Court's failure to cite Degnan on this point and its use of the word "arguably." But the support adduced, the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, is for this purpose
equally flawed because it accepts Degnan's account. The same is true of WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, § 100A.
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accepted by the Maryland state courts, that Rule 41 (b) controlled the
outcome of the case. 42
Appearing, therefore, to chart a course independent of the parties' arguments, 43 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court reasoned that,
the judgment in question being federal, federal law governed its
preclusive effects and that it was for the Court to specify the content
of that law. 44 Finding no need for a uniform federal preclusion rule
in a case involving state substantive law, Justice Scalia asserted that
uniformity would in fact be "better served by having the same claimpreclusive rule (the state rule) apply whether the dismissal has been
ordered by a state or a federal court. '45 Thus, he observed, notwithstanding changes in the legal landscape,
[T] he result decreed by Dupasseurcontinues to be correct for diversity cases.... As we have alluded to above, any other rule would
produce the sort of "forum-shopping... and ... inequitable admin-

istration of the laws" that Erie seeks to avoid .... since filing in, or
removing to, federal court would be encouraged by the divergent
effects that the litigants would anticipate from likely grounds of
dismissal.

46

Finally, acknowledging that federal incorporation of state law
would not obtain "in situations in which state law is incompatible with
federal interests,"4 7 Justice Scalia could discern "no conceivable federal interest in giving [California's] time bar more effect in other
courts than the California courts themselves would impose. '48 In reversing the judgment, the Court left for determination on remand the
content of California's law of claim preclusion thus incorporated as
49
federal common law.

42 See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500-06.
43 See id. at 506 ("Having concluded that the claim-preclusive effect, in Maryland,
of this California federal diversity judgment is dictated neither by Dupasseur v.
Rodzerau, as petitioner contends, nor by Rule 41 (b), as respondent contends, we turn
to consideration of what determines the issue.").
44 See id. at 508 ("In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive ef-

fect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity.").
45 Id.
46 Id. at 508-09 (citations omitted).
47 Id. at 509. "If, for example, state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to
dismissals for willful violation of discovery orders, federal courts' interest in the integ-

rity of their own processes might justify a contrary federal rule." Id.
48 Id.
49 See id.
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C. Assessing the Court's Work
On the whole, the Court should be applauded for the result and
the reasoning in Semtek. 50 The case was very difficult, and it might
have been thought to present a dangerous challenge both to the
Court's own power under the Enabling Act and to the power of the
federal courts in general to deal effectively with duplicative litigation.
Moreover, the case required the Court to reconcile two lines of cases
that could be thought to point in different directions. In finessing the
challenge, suppressing the desire to maximize efficiency in adjudication, and achieving a workable accommodation of precedent, the
Court accomplished a great deal, unanimously and in short order.5 1
The structure ofJustice Scalia's opinion for the Court is, however,
misleading in suggesting that the Court was "chart[ing] a course independent of the parties' arguments." 52 In fact, the opinion accepted
critically important arguments made by Semtek, particularly in its reply brief, and/or in my 1986 article, on which Semtek relied: from the
nature of the federal obligation to respect federal judgments, 53 to the
very limited role that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can play in
shaping federal preclusion law, 5 4 to the way in which the Court's Erie
jurisprudence can be assimilated to its (non-diversity) federal common-lawjurisprudence,5 5 and to the type of federal interest that may
56
support uniform judge-made rules of preclusion in diversity cases.
Ironically, one of the few arguments made by Semtek that the
Court's opinion did not incorporate could have prevented a problem
potentially arising from the formulation of its holding. Semtek argued that the diversity judgment at issue in the case "should have the
same preclusive effect as if it had been rendered by a state court in the
first forum," seeking to draw the Court's attention to the fact that the
50

See The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115

HARV.

L. REv. 306, 467

(2001) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
51 The case was argued on December 5, 2000 and decided on February 27, 2001.
See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 497. One can only wonder whether decision with more deliberate speed might have eliminated the problems in Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court that I discuss below.
52 See supra text accompanying note 43.
53 Compare Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-08, with Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note
41, at 14, and Burbank, supra note 2, at 739-47.
54 Compare Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-08, with Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note
41, at 2-11, and Burbank, supra note 2, at 772-75, 782-83.

55

Compare Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09, with Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at

28-32, and Burbank, supranote 2, at 783-97; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra

note 41, at 14-17.
56 Compare Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09, with Reply Brief for Petitioner, supranote
41, at 15-16 & n.14, and Burbank, supra note 2, at 764-65, 780-83.
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case presented horizontal, and not just vertical, interjurisdictional issues. 57 Had the Court heeded this reasoning, it would not have characterized the litigation as "a classic case for adopting, as the federally
prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state
5 8 As I
courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits."
shall develop in discussing the limitations aspects of Semtek, it is hardly
a "classic case," except perhaps for the Marquis de Sade, and the rule
prescribed by the Court is, if not the wrong rule, then not quite the
right rule. First, however, I turn to the logically anterior question of
Rule 41(b), the Court's treatment of which is the other troublesome
aspect of its opinion.
1. Rule 41(b): Carving Sausage Is No Prettier Than Making It
Faced with a formidable challenge to the validity of Rule 41 (b) as
interpreted by the Maryland state courts,5 9 the Court in Semtek chose
to avoid definitive resolution of the issue. That its interpretation of
the rule is strained, indeed opaque, bespeaks the difficulty of the enterprise. It also may reflect the failure of Semtek (and, hence in part,
my failure) to provide adequate help, although, pace the
postmodernists, law and legal language can and should constrain in57 Instead, this Court should hold that this diversity judgment, involving a
state-law limitations dismissal, should have the same preclusive effect as if it
had been rendered by a state court in the first forum, under Dupasseur...
and Erie ....
If the matter is treated as one of federal common law, the
pertinent state-law resjudicata rule should be borrowed because there is no
federal interest requiring the use of a nationally uniform rule governing the
effect of a limitations dismissal. Where the first forum, like California, follows the traditional rule that limitations dismissals do not have claim preclusive effect, the second forum is free to apply its own statute of limitations.
Indeed, under this Court's full faith and credit decisions, the second forum
would be free to do so even if the first forum treated the limitations as barring the plaintiff "from thereafter maintaining an action to enforce the
claim in that State." RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 49, cmt. a (1942).
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supranote 41, at 1-2 (footnote omitted); see id. at 2 ("[The
question in Semtek] should be answered by reference to the preclusion law of the
forum state in which the diversity court sat and to the full faith and credit obligationsthat
would be owed to that forum state courts'judgments." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)); id. at 3 (Rule 41(b) is silent on the answers to the questions "what law will
govern, the scope of that which is precluded, and thw territorialscope to be given that rule
of preclusion." (emphasis added)); id. at 5 ("The quest to serve 'full faith and credit
principles' . . . therefore favors Semtek's argument, not Lockheed's."); id. at 14
(Proper analysis "would respect the prerogatives of both California and Maryland.").
58 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
59 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 4-10; Burbank, supranote 2, at
772-75; Burbank, supra note 4, at 1121-31; supra note 20.
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genuity, and the Court's technique of selectively addressing arguments, rather than grappling with a more difficult reality, did not help
60
matters.
Semtek argued that the Court should interpret Rule 41(b) so as
to avoid the Enabling Act question, but its suggested interpretation
60 As Semtek pointed out, Lockheed's argument, based on the plain language of
Rule 41 (b), overreached, as some lower federal and state courts have overreached, in
imputing to that rule anything more than the prescription of one element of preclusion law, to wit, whether a dismissal has the capacity to be claim preclusive as "an
adjudication upon the merits." Even read literally, the rule simply does not speak to
the question of the law that otherwise governs the effect of a dismissal. See Reply Brief
of the Petitioner, supra note 41, at 2-4. Yet, by addressing Lockheed's argument the
Court obscured that distinction, observing, "This would be a highly peculiar context
in which to announce a federally prescribed rule on the complex question of claim
preclusion, saying in effect, 'All federal dismissals (with three specified exceptions)
preclude suit elsewhere, unless the court otherwise specifies.'" Seintek, 531 U.S. at
503; see also id. at 503-04; infra note 83.
Drawing this distinction would not have solved the problem, however. First, the
state in which a federal diversity court sits may not regard a particular dismissal as
having the capacity to yield claim preclusion; that is, it may not regard such a dismissal as "an adjudication upon the merits." That in fact appears to be true of California
law with respect to limitations dismissals, since there are cases suggesting that a limitations dismissal in a suit advancing one theory of recovery does not preclude a subsequent lawsuit involving the same underlying transaction but seeking recovery on
another theory (as to which a different limitations period applies). See, e.g., Koch v.
Rodlin Enters., 273 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that prior summary judgment which was entered on grounds that action was barred by statute of limitations
did not act as res judicata to preclude subsequent action for common-law fraud).
Second, the problem of invalidity under the Enabling Act does not go away simply
because a rule attempts to state law in only part of territory that is forbidden to the
enterprise.
This aspect presented a third problem for me, and hence for Semtek to the extent that it relied on my scholarship. In working out the law governing the preclusive
effects of federal question judgments, I had started with the proposition that uniform
federal rules are necessary to determine the preconditions, such as validity and finality, that determine whether there is ajudgment entitled to consideration for preclusive effect, and I had reasoned that within the sphere of claim preclfsion, the
question whether a judgment is "on the merits," is for that purpose functionally
equivalent. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 764-65. Unfortunately, when I turned to
the law governing the preclusive effects of diversity judgments, although I did signal
that my "tentative conclusion [that such reasoning was 'as applicable to judgments on
state law questions as it is to federal question judgments'] should be tested within the
analytical framework" dictated by Erie jurisprudence, id. at 780-81 n.226, I also asserted that, although Rule 41 (b) was formally invalid under the Enabling Act, the
error was harmless because the rule stated law that was within the power of federal
courts to make as common law. See id. at 782-83. As Semtek demonstrates, the latter
assertion requires the same qualification.
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was hardly clear and not clearly coherent. 61 Neither is the Court's.
Justice Scalia's opinion indulges in an elaborate play on the words "on
the merits," moving from the proposition that, because eligibility for
claim preclusive effect in some, but not other, jurisdictions has expanded over time to include adjudications that do not in fact resolve
the merits of litigation, "it is no longer true that a judgment 'on the
62
merits' is necessarily ajudgment entitled to claim-preclusive effect,"
to the proposition that "there are a number of reasons for believing
that the phrase 'adjudication upon the merits' does not bear that
meaning in Rule 41 (b) ."63 One of those reasons was that "if California law left petitioner free to sue on this claim in Maryland even after
the California statute of limitations had expired, the federal court's
extinguishment of that right (through Rule 41 (b) 's mandated claimpreclusive effect of its judgment) would seem to violate [the Enabling
Act's] limitation." 6 4 Another was that, "as so interpreted, the Rule
would in many cases violate the federalism principle of [Erie] by engendering 'substantial variations [in outcome] between state and federal litigation' which would 'likely . . . influence the choice of a
forum.'

"65

61 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 3 ("The most that can be said is
that Rule 41(b) provides a procedure for identifying a federal judgment with the
potential to bar another action as a matter of claim preclusion .... The 'upon the
merits' label is a mere datum, for whatever significance state law chooses to accord
it."); id. at 9-10 ("Rule 41(b) is better interpreted as a procedural rule affording a
datum that the federal court regards its decision as 'on the merits,' for whatever significance that has under the preclusion law of the applicable jurisdiction.").
62 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 503-04.
65 Id. (citations omitted). To'those who are distressed by this aspect of Semtek,
viewing it as reintroducing analytical confusion (as between standards of validity of
federal common law and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) that it was a major purpose of the Court's opinion in Hanna v. Plumer,380 U.S. 460 (1965) to dispel, I offer
three consoling thoughts. First, the Court had already all but said that, interpreted as
it had been by the Maryland courts, Rule 41 (b) would be invalid under the Enabling
Act, and the language in question came after, and was analytically distinct from, that
conclusion. Second, in Hannaitself, the Court observed that "acourt, in measuring a
Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the character
and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow in state
courts." Id. at 472; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner, supranote 41, at 6. Third, on a
number of occasions, the Court has "interpreted the Federal Rules... with sensitivity
to important state interests and regulatory policies." Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996); see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
750-52 (1980); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943); Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 9.
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For these and other reasons, the Court chose narrowly to interpret a Rule 41(b) dismissal "upon the merits" as barring refiling of
the same claim in the same federal court. 66 Its route to that interpre-

tation involved another elaborate play on words, in this case, the
words "dismissal without prejudice" in Rule 41 (a),67 which the Court
deemed the opposite of an "adjudication upon the merits" and the
effect of which, with the help of Black's Law Dictionary, the Court confined to the same court.68
Confronted with such a transparently dubious interpretation, it
may be useful, as it might have been useful for the Court, to explore
the drafting history of Rule 41(b), to see whether it illuminates the
problem presented in Semtek. In fact, the drafting history reveals a
very unsatisfactory and confused process, major last-minute changes,
and not uncharacteristic of the original Advisory Committee, lack of
69
careful attention to the limitations on the enterprise.
The rulemakers' major goals initially were (1) to define for the
new procedural system the circumstances in which a plaintiff could
take a voluntary nonsuit, that is, dismiss a lawsuit without leave of
court, retaining the freedom to refile it, and (2) to ensure that the
federal courts would not be saddled with a rule like that of the common law, still (in 1935) obtaining in some states, whereby the plaintiff
had an unfettered right to take a nonsuit late in the progress of a case
66 See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504-06. Note that the Court's formulation either assumes that all jurisdictions agree about the scope of the claim that is precluded (not
unreasonable, perhaps, on the facts of Semtek), or reflects the error in Lockheed's
argument that Semtek had pointed out. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41,
at 2-4. The Court left to another day the answer to the question whether "in a diversity case, a federal court's 'dismissal upon the merits' (in the sense we have described), under circumstances where a state court would decree only a 'dismissal
without prejudice,' abridges a 'substantive right' and thus exceeds the authorization
of the Rules Enabling Act." Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506. "We think the situation will present itself more rarely than would the arguable violation of the Act that would ensue
from interpreting Rule 41 (b) as a rule of claim preclusion; and if it is a violation, can
be more easily dealt with on direct appeal." Id.
67 See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
68 The primary meaning of "dismissal without prejudice," we think, is dismissal without barring the defendant from returning later, to the same court,
with the same underlying claim. That will ordinarily (though not always)
have the consequence of not barring the claim from other courts, but its primary meaning relates to the dismissing court itself.
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505.
69 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1132 ("IT]he Advisory Committee ... had no
coherent or consistent view of the limitations imposed by the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy.").
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and refile the same action . 0 But, in the process of revising a draft
based on a Minnesota statute that elaborated all of the circumstances
in which a case could be dismissed without prejudice and abolished
any other such bases, the Committee included a number of situations
where, in the court's discretion, a case might be involuntarily dis71

missed without prejudice.

Between the publication of the May 1936 Preliminary Draft and
the April 1937 Proposed Rules, a number of influences prompted the
Advisory Committee to deal explicitly with voluntary and involuntary
72
dismissals, and with dismissals without prejudice and with prejudice.
In comments on the Preliminary Draft, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, observing that "Rule 4[1] enumerates the circumstances in which an action may be dismissed without
prejudice," then raised the question "whether all dismissals should not
70

See PROCEEDINGS OF MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PRO-

CEDURE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 14-20,

1935) [hereinaf-

ter PROCEEDINGS (Nov. 14-20, 1935)], microformed on RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL

1935-1988, Nos.
CI-1 17-71 to CI-I 18-0 (Cong. Info. Serv.). The availability of these papers fulfills the
hope that they would "be made generally accessible to scholars and that permission
[would] be granted to cite their contents." Burbank, supra note 4, at 1132 n.529.
CONFERENCE, COMMITTEES ON RULEs OF PRACrICE AND PROCEDURES,

71

See PROCEEDINGS OF MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PRO-

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES (Feb. 20-25, 1936) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS (Feb. 20-25, 1936)], microformed on RECORDS OF'THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, COMMTrTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, Nos.
CEDURE

CI-211-28 to CI-211-88 (Cong. Info. Serv.). Both alternatives of Rule 41 (Rule 48 in
this version, entitled "Dismissal Without Prejudice") that were published for comment
in May 1936 defined the circumstances in which a plaintiff, the parties (by stipulation), or the court could dismiss an action without prejudice. See Preliminary Draft of
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States and the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia 85-87 (May 1936). The Advisory Committee's note
cited a number of state statutes, including "2 Mason's Minn. Stats. (1927), § 9322."
Id. at 87. As put by a member of the Committee during its February 1936 meetings,
"The thing we are doing now is to provide the cases in which the court may dismiss
the action. We are providing specific cases, put it that way, in which the court may
dismiss the action without the dismissal being ajudgment in bar." PROCEEDINGS (Feb.
20-25, 1936), supra, microformed on RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE,

COM-

MrI-rEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, No. CI-211-69 (Cong.
Info. Serv.).
72 As indicated above and recognized by the Committee, the first alternative version published in 1936 already included some involuntary dismissals; it simply did not
purport to specify when such dismissals would be with, as opposed to without,
prejudice. Moreover, even before publication of the Preliminary Draft, the reporter
was raising the question of the relationship between this rule and the separate rule on
directed verdicts. See PROCEEDINGS (FEB. 20-25, 1936), supra note 71, microformed on
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES,

1935-1988, No. CI-211-86 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (statement of Mr. Clark).
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be deemed to be with prejudice except in cases that may be specified,
73
among which ought to be included actions prematurely instituted."
Thus encouraged, and reassured that it had the power to do so,74
by November of 1936 the Advisory Committee had decided to make
an effort "to provide definitely when dismissals shall be made without
prejudice and when they shall operate to bar the bringing of a new
suit," but the effort "present[ed] many serious problems."7 5 Following
consideration of drafts that sought to state two separate rules governing dismissals without and with prejudice, and in response to the
reporter's concerns that there was "practically complete overlapping
between" them and that "[1] isting is always dangerous because of possible omissions," 76 the Committee worked from his redraft of a unitary
rule providing presumptively that voluntary dismissals were without
73 Letter from Carlton Fox to Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure 2
(June 18, 1936), microformed on RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES,

1935-1988, No. CI-5102-15 (Cong. Info.

Serv.). He continued, "Furthermore, it would seem that provision might be made to
the effect that dismissals should be deemed to be on the merits, except where for
good cause shown an order is entered at the time of dismissal specifically stating that
the dismissal is without prejudice." Id.
74 A written comment by Edgar Tolman, a member of the Committee and its
Secretary, on a pre-May 1936 draft of the rule suggested that two 1936 decisions of the
Supreme Court established the Committee's "right to change the law in regard to the
dismissal of cases and the effect thereof." Suggestions of Mr. Tolman (Tentative Draft
III), microformed on RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEES ON RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, No. CI-2821-95 (Cong. Info. Serv.). But,
the writer invited "suggestion [on] the question whether or not we should go to the
lengths to which the present rule goes," observing that "[t]here may be dynamite in
it." Id. At most, the cases relied on established the validity of a court rule altering the
absolute right at common law and in equity to withdraw or dismiss the plaintiff's
case/suit in the absence of prejudice to the defendant other than the expense and
vexation of additional litigation. SeeJones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 18-25 (1936); Bronx
Brass Foundry, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U.S. 230, 232 (1936).
At an institute on the new federal rules sponsored by the American Bar Association in 1938, the same individual observed: "Since this rule attempts to state the effect
of a dismissal, the question has been raised whether it is really procedural. I call your
attention to the English case... [Poyserv. Minors, 7 Q.B.D 329 (1881)] which involved
that very point." PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 310
(1938). I need hardly belabor the quaint, pre-realist assumption that this nineteenthcentury English case involved the "very point" as did the question of the Supreme
Court's power under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. See id. at 306 (describing
Poyser).
75 Edgar B. Tolman, Address Before the Law Club in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 6, 1936),
microformed on REcoRDs OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEES ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES,

1935-1988, No. CI-929-76 (Cong. Info. Serv.).

76 Comments for the Style Committee by Mr. Clark and Mr. Friedman on P.D.
[Preliminary Draft] February, 1937, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Mar. 3, 1937),

SEMTEK,

2002]

FORUM

SHOPPING,

AND

FEDERAL COMMON

1045

LAW

prejudice, while involuntary dismissals were with prejudice. Unfortunately, that approach "move[d] too fast and far in the other
direction."

77

The Committee had approved in April 1937, and was about to
publish for comment, language in Rule 4[1](b) providing that
"[u]nless the court in its order for dismissal shall otherwise specify a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,"
when the chairman alerted the reporter "to one mistake we have
made in the provision." 78 Pointing out that dismissals for both lack of

jurisdiction and improper venue were not "provided for in the rule"
and that they "should not have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits,

' 79

William D. Mitchell urged a change in the rule to accom-

modate those situations, and such a change was included in the Proposed Rules that were published for comment.8 0 So much for the
danger of "listing."8'
The drafting history summarized above makes it clear that the
Court in Semtek was corect in positing that the rulemakers used the
words "operates as an adjudication upon the merits" in Rule 41 (b) as
the opposite of "without prejudice,!' and thus as synonymous with the
words "with prejudice.18 2 It also reveals, however, that to the extent
microformed on RECORDS

OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEES ON RuLES OF

1935-1988, No. CI-501-14 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. Charles E. Clark (May 5, 1937),

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES,

77
78

microformed on

RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES,

79

CoMMnrEs

ON

RuLEs

OF

1935-1988, No. CI-2817 (Cong. Info. Serv.).

Id.

80 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 101-04
(1937) (Rule 42 in this version).
81 See supra text accompanying note 76. Rule 41 (b) was amended in 1963 to add
dismissals "for lack of an indispensable party" to those excepted from the presumptive
rule, and in 1966 to change that language to "for failure to join a party under Rule
19." See supra note 37; see also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-88 (1961)
(expansively defining "jurisdiction").
82 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS (Nov. 14-20 1935), supra note 70, microformed on
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEES ON RuLEs OF PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURES,

1935-1988, No. CI-117-35 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (Mr. Mitchell: "May I sug-

gest that the words 'the plaintiff may dismiss' ought to be qualified by 'without

prejudice,' or 'without determination of the merits,' because the word 'dismiss' is
sometimes used to mean a dismissal on the merits."); supra text accompanying notes
73, 75; see also PROCEEDINGS

OF THE WASHINGTON,

D.C.

INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL

RUL.Es

190 (1938) [hereinafter WASHINGTON INSTITUTE] (Rule 41(a) "provides that an action
dismissed by filing a notice of dismissal, unless otherwise stated in the notice, is without prejudice, and that means it is not an adjudication."); PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW
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they thought about the question, the rulemakers believed that they
had authority to define both when a dismissal would not be eligible to
bar another action on the same claim and when it would be eligible
for such effect, and that they sought to do the latter in Rule 41 (b).83 I
have found no suggestion in this history that the rulemakers intended
84
to cabin the effects to the rendering court.
For those who are not disposed to consult or consider such
materials, the Court's error (as a matter of interpretation ) in confining the effects of a Rule 41 (b) dismissal to the rendering court seems
clear in light of the following consideration: if that had been the intended ambit of the rule, it would not have made sense to except dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, 85 since under the
doctrine of direct estoppel (issue preclusion), the plaintiff would have
been precluded from refiling the case in the same court in any
ON FEDERAL RULES 277 (1938) (Rule 41(b) "dismissal is with
prejudice, and is an adjudication unless the court should specify to the contrary.").
83 They may also have proceeded under the unarticulated assumption that there
were no differences in the laws of various jurisdictions as to the scope of claim preclusion. That was a much more reasonable assumption in the 1930s than it is today. See
Burbank, supra note 2, at 765-66. In that light, their attempt to state a presumptive
rule of eligibility for preclusion appears less "peculiar," if only because to them claim
preclusion was less "complex." Cf Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 501-03 (2001); supra note 60. Still, it was and is more complex than the
Court's response to Lockheed's argument may otherwise suggest. See supra notes 60,
66.
84 In discussing the preclusive effects of a dismissal under Rule 41(a) (1), Edgar
Tolman observed that "[e]ven if [the] claim is brought in a state court, I should think
that the state court as well as a federal court, would refuse to permit recovery on a
claim which had been adversely adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction."
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, supranote 82, at 119; id. at 207 ("I think the words 'operates
as an adjudication upon the merits' mean that the dismissal has the same effect as if
the court, after a hearing, entered ajudgment dismissing the action and stating 'this
dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.'").
The Court's interpretation yields a "highly peculiar" rule of preclusion, not even
extending to other courts within the same system. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503; see also
supra note 60. It may have taken inspiration from the suggestion, with respect to
statute of limitations dismissals, that "[h] ere as elsewhere, Rule 41 (b) need mean only
that the dismissal precludes relitigation of the same limitations issues in the same
court. Any greater effect should depend on independent analysis." 18 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7, § 4441, at 373. Although that formulation refers to
issues rather than claims (and may not have intended "the same court" in the literal
sense apparently intended by the Court in Semntek), and although the antecedent discussion well reveals the failings of Rule 41 (b), see id. §§ 4435-4441, the proposal is no
more faithful to the text of the rule or its history than the Court's. For problems with
such an approach outside of the limitations area, as recommended in, for example,
id.§ 4467, at 648, see Burbank, supra note 21, at 102-06, 118-21.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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event. 8 6 It might have been better, after all, to decide the Enabling

Act question.
2.

Complexity on Stilts

Perhaps the most general point of my 1986 article was that, given
the characteristics and needs of our federal system, Professor
Degnan's proposed rule for interjurisdictional preclusion, however attractive because of its simplicity and predictability, would come at a
cost too great 8 7 In rejecting uniform federal preclusion law in Semtek,
the Court acknowledged some of those characteristics and needs as
previously articulated, particularly in Eids progeny, and confirmed
their contemporary relevance. 88 It failed, however, to consider or adequately to account for other such characteristics and needs arising
from the fact that the rule at issue in Semtek would operate in horizontal as well as vertical interjurisdictional space. Indeed, and ironically,
the Court committed a mistake precisely the opposite of the mistake
that it has made in situations involving the interjurisdictional preclusive effects of a state court judgment, but perhaps for the same
reasons.
According to the Court in Semtek, the task of the state courts on
remand is to determine the claim preclusive effect of a statute of limitations dismissal as a matter of California law and to give the federal
diversity judgment the same preclusive effect as a matter of federal
common law. It appears that California law adheres to the traditional
view, whereby a limitations dismissal usually bars the remedy and not
the right, is not an adjudication on the merits, and does not have
86

Id.
87
88

See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 45, cmt. d (1942).
The term "direct estoppel" is used in the Restatement of this Subject to indicate that the binding effect of ajudgment as to matters actually litigated and
determined in one action applies to a subsequent action between the parties
based upon the same cause of action, where the plaintiff is not precluded
from maintaining such an action by the extinguishmdnt of his cause of action under the rules as to merger and bar.

See Burbank, supra note 2, at 739.
See Leading Cases, supra note 50, at 476-77. But see Erichson, supra note 20.

Professor Burbank cautioned us not to ignore the inherent complexity: "We
need a law of interjurisdictional preclusion that is sensitive to the complexity
of our federal system .... " No court has reliably adopted such a nuanced
approach to choice of preclusion law, however, and there is no reasonable
prospect that courts will do so in the future.
Id. at 1014 (footnote omitted).
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claim preclusive effect within California. 9 Many states, however, have
abandoned the traditional view, barring a subsequent suit 'within the
state on the same claim (defined in the broad, modern transactional
sense). That is, such states regard a limitations dismissal as an adjudication on the merits domestically.9 0
It is also the traditional view, however, that full faith and credit
does not usually require the second forum's (F2's) courts to bar a suit
that is timely under the F2's limitations law but that has been dismissed as untimely by the courts of the first forum (FI). 9 1 So long as
89 See, e.g., Koch v. Rodlin Enters., 273 Cal. Rptr. 438, 441-42 (Ct. App. 1990);
supra note 60; see also, e.g., Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 5 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2000);
Lackner v. LaCroix, 602 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. 1979); Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139
F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998). For the traditional view, see RESTATEMENT OFJUDCMENTS § 49 (1942).
Note, however, the following:
Ajudgment for the defendant may be based upon the ground that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an action in the State in which the judgment is
rendered and not on a ground which would be applicable to an action in
other States. In such a case the judgment is on the merits to the extent that
it will bar the plaintiff from maintaining a further action in that State, but it
is not on the merits so far as actions in other States are concerned. Thus, if
the plaintiff brings an action to enforce a claim in one State and the defendant sets up the defense that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations in that State, the plaintiff is precluded from thereafter maintaining an
action to enforce the claim in that State. He is not, however, precluded
from maintaining an action to enforce the claim in another State if it is not
barred by the Statute of Limitations in that State.
Id. § 49 cmt. a.
This may reflect a narrow conception of a "cause of action" or "claim," with
direct estoppel (issue preclusion) picking up the slack. See supra note 86; cf. Advest,
Inc. v. Wachtel, 668 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1995) (stating both that "the only issue that
is precluded from litigation is whether the Connecticut statute of limitations has run"
and that "the running of Connecticut's statute of limitations precludes the defendants
in the present action from bringing the same claim in Connecticut").
90 See Rose v. Town of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[Olur survey of
recent cases suggests a clear trend toward giving claim-preclusive effect to dismissals
based on statutes of limitations."); see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OFJUDGMENTS §

19

cmt. f, reporter's notes (1982).
91 See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327 (1839) (dictum); Brent v.
Bank of Wash., 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596, 617 (1836) (dictum); Bank of U.S. v. Donnally,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 361, 373 (1834) (dictum); Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d
540, 541-43 (2d Cir. 1933); Lee v. Swain Bldg. Materials Co., 529 So. 2d 188, 190-91
(Miss. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJJUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. f, reporter's notes; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 49 cmt. a. There are numerous lower court cases to the
contrary, although it seems that in most of them the court was acting to preclude
from a view of wise policy as a matter of (F2) state law, even when it attributed the
result to the requirements of full faith and credit. See, e.g., Sautter v. Interstate Power
Co., 567 N.W.2d 755, 757-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Thus, the current state of the
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that remains the law of full faith and credit, Semtek itself should be
decided on remand so as to accord the federal diversity judgment the
same preclusive effect to which a California state court judgment
would be entitled (no bar to suit in Maryland under a different statute
of limitations). Where, however, a federal diversity court sits in a state
that treats limitations dismissals as adjudications on the merits with
full claim preclusive effect within the state, 9 2 the result of Semtek would
appear to be that a federal diversity judgment bars suit interjurisdictionally, even though the identical judgment of a state court a block
away does not (as a matter of full faith and credit).
Awareness of this problem prompted Semtek to flag the question
of the territorial scope of the rule to be fashioned as federal common
law and to frame the solution it urged in terms of the preclusive effects to which the identical judgment of a California state court would
be entitled as a matter of full faith and credit. 93 This proposed solution has the additional benefit of implementing the rule in Dupasseur
v. Rochereau.9 4 In answering the preclusion question using a full faith
federal obligation is unclear, and many of the authorities are hopelessly confused, in
part because of lack of precision in the use of legal terminology. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § I10 cmts. a-b (rev. 1988).
92 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Semtek also suggested the relevance
of the Court's decision in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986), where,
deeming itself free of the obligations of both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
full faith and credit statute, the Court nonetheless fashioned a federal common-law
rule that mimicked the full faith and credit solution. See Reply Brief for Petitioner,
supranote 41, at 15; Burbank, supra note 17, at 1552, 1560-71.
94 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875).
The only effect that can be justly claimed for the judgment in the Circuit
Court of the United States, is such as would belong to judgments of the State
courts rendered under similar circumstances .... It is apparent, therefore,
that no higher sanctity or effect can be claimed for the judgment of the
Circuit Court of the United States rendered in such a case under such circumstances than is due to the judgments of the State courts in a like case
and under similar circumstances. If by the laws of the State ajudgment like
that rendered by the Circuit Court would have had a binding effect as
against Rocherau, if it had been rendered in a State court then, it should
have the same effect, being rendered by the Circuit Court.
Id. at 135. The reference to state law in the last sentence of this quotation should not
be allowed to obscure the general rule, the dominance of which may be suggested by
the immediately preceding discussion of appellate jurisdiction, where the Court assimilated what it was doing as a matter of federal common law to what, in the case of
state court judgments, is required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 134; Burbank, supra note 2, at 741-42. It is confirmed by the Court's
occasional and confusing ascription of the obligation to respect federal judgments to
the full faith and credit statute. See id. at 740-47.
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and credit model, there was no need in Dupasseurto consider any law
other than that of Louisiana, the state in which the federal diversity
court sat to administer state contract and property law and in whose
courts the question of preclusion arose. But the model does require
consideration of other law in some cases, just as, when the interjurisdictional preclusion question involves a state courtjudgment, the full
faith and credit statute requires such consideration.
In situations where a state court is Fl, which triggers the application of the full faith and credit statute, the Court has neglected the
vertical relationship between federal and state law in the hypothetical
domestic state court setting that is the statutory referent determining
horizontal (interjurisdictional) preclusive effect. 95 In Semtek, on the
other hand, the Court neglected the horizontal work required of the
rule it fashioned with a vertical accommodation in mind.
Although opposites in one sense, these mistakes may spring from
the same sources. First, in both contexts, the refinement I have insisted on will not make a practical difference in most cases.9 6 But,
with respect to the measure of the credit due to a state court judgment, as the Court's decisions in cases not governed by the statute and
in cases involving claims within exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction seem to confirm, the different interpretations will yield different results in some cases, namely cases involving robust federal
substantive policies.

97

Similarly, in tying (most of) the preclusive effects of a federal diversity judgment to the law that would be applied in the state in which
95 See supra note 15.
96 Thus, where a state court has rendered a judgment, the preclusive effects of
which are in question in subsequent proceedings in another state's courts or in federal court, under either the Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit statute
or my own, the domestic preclusion law of the rendering state will usually govern. See
Burbank, supra note 2, at 800.
97 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (holding
that a state court judgment approving settlement of shareholders' state and federal
claims was eligible for preclusive effect in federal court under the full faith and credit
statute, even though the federal claims could not have been brought in state court);
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (holding that unreviewed findings of state administrative agency have no preclusive effect on federal age
discrimination claim); Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (holding that unreviewed findings of state
administrative agency could preclude an employee's discrimination claims under Reconstruction era civil rights statutes, but not Title VII claims); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of
Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that the full faith and credit
statute requires a federal court to consider state claim preclusion law when determining whether a state court judgment bars a subsequent federal antitrust claim that
could not have been brought in state court); Burbank, supra note 17, at 1560-71;
Burbank, supra note 2, at 822-29; supra note 93.
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the federal court sat, the Court in Semtek successfully accommodated
both the vertical and horizontal characteristics and needs of the federal system in most cases, since in most cases that law will be the same
as the law that would govern the interjurisdictional preclusive effects
of the identical judgment of a state court a block away. Whenever,
however, F2 remains free to depart from Fl's domestic preclusion law
as a matter of full faith and credit-to give Fl's judicial proceedings
either less or greater preclusive effect than they would be given in
Fl-the Semtek formulation could lead to different results as between
the judgments of state and federal courts in the same state, and thus
lead to problems of forum shopping and other strategic litigation be98
havior that it was the Court's purpose to prevent.
Second, it may be that the distinctions I have drawn simply escaped the Court's attention. The practical results of my reinterpretation of the full faith and credit statute as applied to state court
judgments might well be unattractive to the current Court, since my
approach would lead to less preclusion of federal claims-reason
enough not to change course. 9 9 But it is difficult to believe, with respect to federal diversity judgments, that the Court consciously opted
for a formulation that in a predictable class of cases would result in
the very practical and social problems that influenced its rejection of
uniform federal preclusion law in the case before it. It is also difficult
to believe that the Court, particularly Justice Scalia, sought in Semtek
indirectly to undermine the traditional full faith and credit treatment
100
of limitations dismissals.
Third, it is possible that the Court in Semtek thought that its formulation did in fact accommodate full faith and credit law and, thus,
that it was laboring under the same mistake that has infected its efforts
to work out the preclusive effects of state awards in workers' compen98 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. Although the Court seems to interpret the full faith and credit statute literally, so as to require F2 to give the same effect
as would be given in Fl-neither less nor greater-this is not the only possible interpretation. Compare 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7, §§ 4403, 4465, 4467
(advocating greater freedom in F2 to depart from F1 law), with Burbank, supra note
21, at 95-102 (discussing problems with that approach).
99 See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1560-71 (discussing federal judgments law in
interjurisdictional cases).
A cynic might speculate about the reasons for the Court's rediscovery of the
full faith and credit statute and of the role of state preclusion law when federal substantive rights are at issue. Such a person should be aware, however,
that this phenomenon is not unique to the present Court.
Burbank, supra note 2, at 801
100 See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
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sation cases' 01 and state court judgments in litigation involving claims
within exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction. 0 2 Perhaps, that
is, the Court believes that whether a state court judgment dismissing a
case on limitations grounds is preclusive in subsequent litigation in
another state depends upon the rendering court's views on a question
10 3
it is without power to decide.
Professor von Mehren has taught me a great deal about these latter questions, requiring me to consider the proper role of a principle
of functional equivalence in full faith and credit jurisprudence, 10 4 as
well as the role, if any, that Fl's views on interjurisdictional effects
should have as a matter of federal law.10 5 Perhaps most important, he
has caused me to understand the relationship between choice of law
and recognition of judgments. 10 6 From that perspective, as Semtek
argued, the traditional full faith and credit treatment of limitations
dismissals is a reflex of the traditional choice of law treatment of limi10 7
tations as a matter of procedure, governed by the law of the forum.
There has been progress on the latter front, advanced by revisions in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,10 8 and one can hope that
the Supreme Court will adjust full faith and credit jurisprudence ac101 See, e.g., Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Indus. Comm'n
v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430

(1943).
102 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. 367; Marrese, 470 U.S. 373.
103 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 822-29; Burbank, supra note 21, at 104-06,
118-21; supra note 33; cf Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 729 n.3 ("[I]t cannot possibly be a
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause for a State to decline to apply another
State's law in a case where that other State itself does not consider it applicable."
(involving choice of law, not judgments)).
104 See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS 1460-63 (1965); Burbank, supra note 2, at 825.
105 SeeVON MEHREN & TRAutvIAN, supranote 104, at 1458-66; Burbank, supra note
2, at 823-25; Burbank, supranote 21, at 104-06; see also Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent
A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153,
161-62 (1949) (arguing that it is federal law rather than state law that determines the
credit which one state shall give to another's judgments).
106 See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 104, at 87-89, 1460, 1466.
107 The traditional [full faith and credit] rule finds justification in the limits
of the choice-of-law process: from the perspective of claim preclusion, a
party like Semtek did not have the opportunity to rely on Maryland limitations law in the California action; from the perspective of issue preclusion,
the timeliness of Semtek's action under Maryland law was neither litigated
nor decided in the California action.
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 5; see Burbank, supranote 2, at 797 n. 317;
Burbank, supra note 21, at 118-19.
108 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (rev. 1988); RUSSELLJ.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 3.2C2 (4th ed. 2001).
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cordingly. But Semtek Was not a proper vehicle to do that, both because, where F1 (California) has dismissed under its shorter statute of
limitations, even the Restatement's approach would not usually lead
to preclusion in F2 (Maryland), 10 9 and because federal common law
designed to avoid forum shopping and other strategic manipulation
of federal jurisdiction cannot lead by example.
CONCLUSION

The solution to the problem of governing law for federal diversity
judgments that I proposed in 1986 was against the grain, if not of
conventional wisdom, then of the prevailing wisdom of the academic
establishment. As Professor Purcell has demonstrated, Henry Hart
forgot what he knew about the manipulation of federal jurisdiction by
corporate defendants and thus reinvented Erie and dismissed its progeny, disparaging doctrine founded in a concern about forum shopping for a different law. 110 How much easier for those who never
knew, or never cared, to do the same, particularly in an age when the

109 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAvS § 142 cmt. f. Note, however,
that Professor Weintraub regards California as a jurisdiction that has adopted a functional approach to limitations questions. See WEnTRAUB, supra note 108, § 3.2C2, at
66-67 n.57.
110 See PURCELL, supra note 12, at 229-57; supra note 26.
Given his intense commitment to the ideal of a "justerjustice," Hart's response to Erie's social purposes was striking and disappointing. He essentially dismissed Brandeis' concern with the "practical discrimination" that
had occurred under Swift. Forum shopping, Hart commented, was merely
.a minor consideration which Brandeis mentioned in passing." Insofar as
jurisdictional statutes created an inequality between in-state and out-of-state
parties, his proposed solution was simply-and not surprisingly-to expand
federal jurisdiction. "[T]he federal government, confident of the justice of
its own procedures" should make the "federal forum equally accessible to
both litigants." Beyond that, the policy of eliminating forum shopping was
an unworthy "triviality." Passing over the specific social problem that Erie
had addressed, he failed to see in it any broader concern with the impact of
social and economic inequality on the legal system's ability to deliver practical justice. His crabbed and sterile view of Erie's social purposes contrasted
with his richly imaginative and transforming portrayal of its political
purposes.
PURCELL, supra note 12, at 251 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 253 ("Hart's concept of
'primary activity' shifted the analysis of the Swift-Erie problem from a social to a psychological level that emphasized the intellectual uncertainty of rational actors trying
to discern which forum, and hence which rule, would judge their behavior."); supra
note 26.

NOTRE DAME

1054

LAW REVIEWV

[VOL. 77:4

federal courts had come to be regarded as bastions for the less
fortunate?"'
Semtek demonstrates that Brandeis' concerns have relevance today. Whatever the formal doctrinal relevance of forum shopping, the
oral argument left no doubt that the Justices were aware of, and that
some of them were troubled by, the lengths to which Lockheed had
gone in manipulating federal jurisdiction in an attempt to secure dif112
ferent and more favorable preclusion law.
My proposed solution was also in tension with the utility func'
tion 3 of federal judges as opposed to academics-although they may
be related-and in particular their perfectly natural desires to maximize their own power and to serve their own institutional interests.
The interest of the federal judiciary in efficiency is unquestionable
and unquestionably powerful. Particularly when state substantive
rights are involved, however, it is important that federal judges not
be given free rein to define and pursue that interest. Preclusion
rules may implicate substantive policies; they have dramatic effects
on substantive rights. When state substantive rights have been in
question, from the perspective of purposes or effects, federal judges

have not in the past been permitted to act with the autonomy of
state judges. Rather, they have been required to do whatjudges of a
particular state would do. The question is whether, in fashioning
preclusion rules for diversity judgments, federal judges should have
greater freedom to act as if the federal courts were a domestic
114
system.

111 Cf Stephen B. Burbank, Introduction: "Plus(a Change.... 1,"21 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 509, 513 (1988) (discussing Yale LawJournarsrejection of an article by Marc
Galanter in letter asserting that "[s]ince the demise of the Hughes, and Vinson
courts, the legal system has proven itself more sensitive to the demands for legal
change from minority interests than any other branch of our government").
112 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, 41, Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (No. 99-1551); supra text accompanying notes
30-40. There was no similar concern expressed about Semtek's forum shopping for a
longer statute of limitations, probably because the Justices regard that as "attributable
to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors."
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); see also Leading Cases,
supra note 50, at 475-76. For the possibility that, at least when statutes of limitations
are no longer insulated from the choice of law process, the Constitution (and its
implementing full faith and credit statute) should no longer be interpreted to permit
this in the case ofjudgments, see supra text accompanying notes 104-09.

113

See RICHARD

A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW

117-26 (1995).

114 Burbank, supra note 2, at 796 (footnotes omitted). In this light, it is an interesting question whether Semtek, which denied to federal courts sitting in diversity "free
rein" in pursuing efficient administration, should be seen as part of the current
Court's reinvigoration of federalism. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
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Of course, this story has what should count as a happy ending, at
least for me, since, the exquisite complications of the limitations problem aside, in Semtek the Supreme Court adopted the solution I recommended as to the preclusive effects of federal diversity judgments and,
in the process, signaled acceptance of my views as to the limitations
the Enabling Act places on the Court's power to promulgate Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure stating preclusion law. That the author of
the Court's opinion, well aware of the origins of that solution, chose
not to acknowledge its provenance, may indicate nothing more than
that the conventions of scholars do not accompany them to the
bench.1 1 5

(2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995). Cutting against that view of the case is the fact that the Court's federal
common-law jurisprudence over the last thirty years has pretty consistently favored
borrowing state law, together with the dominant thrust of its Eriejurisprudence. See
Burbank, supra note 2, at 758, 785-87. Yet, the Court, including Justice Scalia, has
not been wholly consistent in borrowing state law to fill the interstices of federal substantive law, see, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), and as we
have seen, most of Erie's progeny have not found favor with the academic establishment; those cases do not all point in the same direction, see, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and the weight of lower court opinions
on the precise question presented in Semtek favored federal judge-made law. Perhaps,
then, this was a case where the existence of precedent was helpful to the implementation of a broader agenda favoring respect for state law. SeeJenna Bednar, Federalism,
Judicial Independence, and the Power of Precedent (unpublished paper) (on file
with author). It is certainly not inconsistent with this view of the case that the Court
insisted on its power over the choice to borrow state law, whereas I had argued that
Congress made that choice for the federal courts in the Rules of Decision Act. See
Burbank, supra note 2, at 753-62, 783-91, 808-10; supra note 17.
115 Incredibly, the Court cited Professor Degnan's article for the proposition that
federal common law governs, see Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497, 508 (2001), even though it thoroughly repudiated his argument as to the content
of that law. In the case of my article, the convention of some scholars had also been
to ignore it. See, e.g., 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,* supra note 7; WRICTrr, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, § 100A. The reason, I expect, is revealed in a letter
Professor Wright sent me about another article: "Perhaps I have been overly influenced by the fact that Ron Degnan was as close a friend as I have ever had. Therefore
I have tended to accept as gospel everything he said in his Yale article...." Letter
from Charles Alan Wright to Stephen B. Burbank (Apr. 17, 1997) (on file with
author).
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